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The Attack on Boulogne 
Account by Lieutenant-Colonel Roger Rowley, OC, 
Stormont, Dundas & Glengarry Highlanders given to 
Historical Officer, 21 September 1944 
BOULOGNE was prepared for all-round 
defence. In addition to its heavy coastal 
fortifications the city was also made ready 
against land attack. For this it offers excellent 
topographical advantages. The town is 
enclosed by a semicircle of high ground whose 
natural focus is the centrally located MONT 
LAMBERT. throughout this semicircle an 
elaborate system of mutually supporting 
strongpoints was constructed to make a 
formidable shield about the port. All positions 
were of three basic types, or combinations of 
types: coastal defence batteries, radar 
installations, and infantry positions. 
ST. MARTIN-BOULOGNE, which was 
included in the initial objective for Stormont, 
Dundas & Glengarry Highlanders, was an 
infantry position, both mined and wired. 
Mines were also known to be placed south of 
LA COCHERIE WOOD. Within the city itself 
were further fortifications; the port, for 
example, had been set apart from the rest of 
the town by a concrete wall and barbed wire. 
The strength of the garrison had been 
estimated at from 5,500 to 7,000, which 
proved to be too modest a figure. The state of 
its morale, however, was accurately judged 
as being somewhat heartless. 
The task of capturing BOULOGNE and 
destroying its garrison was assigned to 3rd 
Canadian Infantry Division on 5 September 
1944. But it had also to assume responsibility 
for the defended coastal area as far as CALAIS. 
This secondary task being allotted to 7th 
Canadian Infantry Brigade, left only two 
brigades available for the assault on 
BOULOGNE. 
76 
The problem was solved by positioning 
8th and 9th Canadian Infantry Brigades 
astride the BOULOGNE- LA CAPELLE road, 
which was to be the axis of attack, and by 
leaving the whole left flank, extending in a 
wide arc to the channel south of the city, to a 
single Machine Gun battalion, the Cameron 
Highlanders of Ottawa. This unit, with 
attached troops, thus played the part of a 
"dummy brigade," and by various deceptive 
measures endeavoured to create an 
impression of equal strength in that quarter. 
The extreme right flank was guarded by 7th 
Canadian Reconnaissance Regiment. 
Topographical considerations, as already 
noted, were of prime importance. The enemy 
very naturally occupied the more 
advantageous ground. The approaches to 
his strongpoints were all covered by mutually 
supporting infantry and artillery positions. 
It was necessary therefore to smother the 
defenders with a weight of bombs and shells 
until the attacking infantry could cross the 
intervening ground and come to grips with 
them. The path of Stormont, Dundas & 
Glengarry Highlanders, as will be seen, lay in 
fairly low ground between strongly armed 
heights. 
The River LIANE, which protected the 
southernmost forts against attack from the 
east, was expected to offer a barrier to later 
stages of the operation. 
Ninth Canadian Infantry Brigade was to 
commence the attack with two battalions 
up-Stormont, Dundas & Glengarry 
Highlanders on the right and North Nova 
Scotia Highlanders on the left. When Phase 
I, the capture ofLA COCHERIE, was complete, 
three armoured assault teams of 31st Tank 
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Brigade were to proceed into BOULOGNE to 
seize the bridges of the LIANE. Each armoured 
team consisted of one troop of 1st Lothians 
(Flails), two troops of 141 Royal Armoured 
Corps (Crocodiles) and one half troop from 
6th Assault Regiment, Royal Engineers 
(A VREs). Each team had also under command 
one platoon of infantry-two from Stormont, 
Dundas & Glengarry Highlanders and one 
from North Nova Scotia Highlanders. Teams 
A and B were to operate with Stormont, 
Dundas & Glengarry Highlanders, two of 
whose companies were to follow on foot to 
clear the river area and establish a firm base 
so that engineers could begin work there. 
The balance of the battalion was to capture 
the citadel ofBOULOGNE. In this it was to be 
assisted by two AVREs (One half troop). 
Phase III was to be the capture of the 
northern part of the OUTREAU peninsula 
(the area centred on LE PORTEL). The final 
phase was to be the capture of the NOCQUET 
feature. 
For Phase I, Stormont, Dundas & 
Glengarry Highlanders had under command 
one troop ofMlOs (3-inch SP anti-tank guns) 
and in support two troops of tanks from lOth 
Canadian Armoured Regiment, one half troop 
87 Assault Squadron, Royal Engineers, one 
section 18 Canadian Field Company, Royal 
Canadian Engineers, 20 Kangaroos and seven 
armoured troop carriers. In later phases 
allotment of these devices varied with the 
nature of the task. 
The Kangaroos are "stripped" Priests, i.e. 
105 mm Self-Propelled equipments (minus 
the gun), converted into troop carriers. Their 
task was to carry the assault troops as far as 
the bomb-cratered area, discharge their 
passengers and return to a rally to await 
orders. In addition six other Kangaroos were 
to go forward with the special armour teams 
to seize the LIANE bridges. 
Stormont, Dundas & Glengarry 
Highlanders were also allotted certain flame-
throwing devices: Lifebuoys (portable flame-
throwers), and a section of Wasps (carrier-
mounted flame-throwers), from 7th Canadian 
Reconnaissance Regiment. 
Air support was arranged to begin before 
the operation with the heavy bombing of five 
selected areas of the defence system. The 
first and largest target, which included the 
MONT LAMBERT feature, was to be subjected 
to an hour's attack, at the conclusion of 
which the land operation was to commence. 
During this time forward troops were to be 
withdrawn 2,000 yards from the perimeter of 
the target area. From H+ 1 to H+3 hours the 
other four areas were to be engaged. In 
addition, rocket bombers and fighter bombers 
were to be available on call. 
The fire plan was most extensive. An 
impressive weight of artillery, including two 
AGRAs, had been assembled. Every potential 
centre of enemy resistance and interference 
had been allotted a series of "stonks" and 
concentrations. An unusual feature of was 
the assignment of two heavy AA regiments to 
fire low airburst concentrations over known 
flak positions during the course of the bombing 
effort. 
For additional fire support Stormont, 
Dundas & Glengarry Highlanders could call 
on their own 3-inch mortars and a platoon of 
4. 2-inch mortars. There were no prearranged 
mortar targets; their fire could be asked for 
by giving map references in clear. As it 
happened, they were not called on. 
At 0855 hours, 17 September 1944, the 
first wave of Lancaster bombers appeared 
over the BOULOG NE area and the air 
programme began. At 0955 hours, just as the 
last bombs fell on Target 1, Stormont, Dundas 
& Glengarry Highlanders moved forward from 
their assembly area near LA CAPELLE and 
crossed the startline. The Kangaroos bearing 
the two assault companies drove forward 
until mines made further progress impossible; 
the troops then debussed and advanced to 
their objectives. "D" Company on the right 
proceeded to the road junction at ST. MARTIN-
BOULOGNE and "B" Company on the left 
seized a stretch of the BOULOGNE- DESVRES 
road. Behind them, on foot, "C" Company 
cleared and captured the woods at LA 
COCHERIE. "A" Company held in reserve. 
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Lancasters of RAF Bomber Command attacking Mont Lambert near Boulogne on the morning of 1 7 September 
1944. At least nine aircraft are visible in the photo. WLU Air Photo 183 I 4058 
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The bombing had done its work well. All 
positions were captured by H+45 minutes. 
The hardest fighting was done by "D" Company 
who ran into a minefield in the draw running 
south from LA COCHERIE Wood along the 71 
grid line. This necessitated an assault on foot 
of 1,000 metres without armoured support, 
for the tanks were also held up in the dead 
ground of the minefield. "B" Company had 
de bussed in the mined area and proceeded to 
its objective without event. Subsequently, 
"C", "D" and particularly "B" Companies were 
subjected to very heavy and extremely 
accurate shelling. 
The disadvantage of the terrain was now 
painfully evident. On the right, beyond the 
road lay heights not yet seized by 8th Canadian 
Infantry Brigade. On the left the slopes of 
MONT LAMBERT were still not in the hands 
of the North Nova Scotia Highlanders. And 
from the southwest, beyond the river, the 
battalion area was in view of enemy positions. 
Form all these points came heavy artillery fire 
which made movement almost impossible. 
Under this fire an engineer officer of 18 
Canadian Field Company did excellent work 
directing the clearing of the minefield up to 
the crossroads. The sole available bulldozer 
had gone astray and the work all had to be 
done by hand. 
Late in the afternoon the two armoured 
columns of 31st Tank Brigade arrived. It had 
originally been intended that Column A should 
proceed along the BOULOGNE- LA CAPELLE 
road, but the CO had found this impassable 
owing to road blocks. It was therefore 
necessary to send both columns along B's 
route (the southern road) as far as the ST. 
MARTIN junction. This route had now been 
cleared for them. 
Phase II therefore commenced with the 
two assault teams setting out for the bridges. 
The two accompanying infantry platoons were 
supplied by"A" Company. ColumnA, starting 
first, went very well, but had to stop short of 
its objective at darkness. Column B had g~t 
off to a bad start owing to deteriorating light 
conditions and also came to a halt within the 
city. The effect of the loss of one hour's 
daylight (the change from "B" to "A" time was 
made on 17 September 1944) was very 
strikingly demonstrated here. 
The next morning, 18 September 1944, 
the battalion started out on its part of Phase 
II. "B" and "C" Companies followed the 
armoured teams. "D" Company and the 
battalion command group proceeded along A 
Team's route, their task being the capture of 
the citadel. With them went two AVREs. The 
remaining platoon of "A" Company which 
accompanied them was reserved as escort for 
PW. 
Arriving at the citadel, which was entirely 
surrounded, castle-fashion, by a high wall, 
"D" Company got into position before the 
bastion gate under cover of smoke. Then 
commenced a strange drama of medieval siege 
mingled with modern warfare. A French 
civilian approached and offered to point out a 
secret tunnel leading into the heart of the 
citadel. Major Stothard, the company 
commander, taking with him one platoon, at 
once entered the tunnel. 
At the same time the Churchills wheeled 
up, raking the ramparts with Besa fire, and 
prepared to place petards against the 
portcullis. The gate was effectively blown in. 
At once a host of white flags waved from the 
walls. To add to the confusion Major Stothard 
had by now appeared in the midst of the 
besieged fort, utterly astonishing its 
"defenders." 
The CO was sent for to take over the 
citadel. About 200 PW, including sixteen 
officers, were rounded up, most of whom were 
drunk and happy to be out of the war. The 
garrison was commanded by a major, who 
was as pleased as the rest. Also present was 
a German Oberstleutnant, formerly head of 
the military tribunal. A fairly large proportion 
were marines. More PW were taken during 
the day. 
Meanwhile Columns A and B had reached 
the river bank where they found the bridges 
blown. "B" and "C" Companies established 
themselves there. Thus ended Phase II. 
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Stormont, Dundas & Glengarry 
Highlanders then rested until further orders 
were issued at an "0" Group at 1500 hours 
the next day, 19 September 1944. The 
battalion had now to capture an objective 
somewhat enlarged from that originally 
planned for Phase III. It consisted of four 
features: the battery position on the 80 ring 
contour; the suburb of OUTREAU; the 
reservoir on the hill; and the two sugar 
factories. (See sketch map and air photo on 
the next page) To do this they were to pass 
through the bridgehead held by Highland 
Light Infantry of Canada on the west bank of 
the LIANE. Zero hour was 1600 hours and 
preparations had to be made quickly. 
At the outset "A" Company found its path 
blocked by mines. As time was limited, "D" 
Company was directed on OUTREAU with 
orders, should opposition be light, to push on 
and take the gun position. Very shortly, 
however, "A" Company was able to extricate 
itself from the minefield and arrived on its 
objective on time, taking the village after little 
fighting and capturing numerous PWs. 
"C" Company meanwhile was likewise held 
up at the start. Their route took them past 
the mouth of the railway tunnel running 
northwest from the road and track junction, 
from which came forth an embarrassing 
number of PW. Here they were forced to 
dispose of over 200 men, including perhaps 
30 black Senegalese complete with fez. 
Proceeding forward once again, they took the 
reservoir area, again without heavy fighting. 
Phase 2 was much more difficult. The gun 
position on the hill west ofOUTREAU number 
15 pieces in all, including six 88 mm guns. 
Opposite Top: This air photo shows the citadel in the 
centre of Boulogne attacked by the SDGs. At the 
bottom left comer the River Liane is visible. Column B 
bridged the river at the railway crossing at the bottom 
of the photo while Column A established itself just 
above where the river leaves the photo at the left. 
WLU Air Photo 15 7 I 4099 
Opposite Bottom: A bridge-laying Churchill A VRE of 
the 79th Armoured Division inBoulogneon 16 Septem-
ber 1944. Photo by D.I. Grant, NAC PA 131234 
But the enemy gunners were engrossed in 
heavy shelling of Highland Light Infantry and 
failed to notice "D" Company forming up in 
the woods east of the hill. 
The hill itself was included among the 
potential artillery tasks and was known by 
the codeword "Norway." (See sketch map and 
air photo) The target had been allotted one 
medium concentration and four field "stonks." 
Observing that the nearest stonk would fall 
too near his own position, Major Stothard, 
the Company Commander, therefore called 
for "Norway, less Target 118." The result was 
magnificent surprise. The infantry, following 
the fire closely, swarmed over the hill with 
bayonets and grenades before the last rounds 
had fallen. At no time were they more than 
250 yards from the bursts. The nearest 
position was overrun and its three 88s taken 
intact; the troops rushed for the other three, 
but these were blown up. The action resulted 
in the taking of 185 PW, but during it Major 
Stothard's only two remaining officers were 
wounded. It was now nearly dark and the 
company consolidated its position and 
remained on the hill all night. 
The following morning one of the 88s was 
manned and fired against the enemy, the 
laying being done by two gunner officers. In 
three rounds a direct hit was made of another 
88 in LE PORTEL which knocked it out. 
With the capture of the sugar factories, 
the battalion's fighting in BOULOGNE was 
almost done. A few strongpoints remained 
yet to be dealt with, but the city itself and its 
most formidable defences were cleared of the 
enemy. 
Despite the well-prepared defences of the 
BOULOGNE fortress, little use was made by 
Stormont, Dundas & Glengarry Highlanders 
of the special mechanical devices which had 
been provided. Following the paralysing blow 
delivered by the bombers, the attack took 
shape along the familiar infantry pattern, 
valuable use being made of artillery support. 
An exception must be made in favour of the 
Kangaroos, which had two roles: (i) to bring 
the infantry swiftly forward from a safe area 
beyond the bombing limits, and (ii) to retain 
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The German strongpoint "Norway" which contained six 88s and nine smaller calibre weapons is clearly visible 
at the bottom of the air photo. To the right. at the edge of the photo is the woods where the SDGsformed up for 
the attack. 
Insert: Sketch map showing the SDGs Phase III objectives. WLU Air Photo 18113036 
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A column of over 400 German prisoners pass through the damaged streets of Boulogne, 21 Sept 44. 
momentum and exploit into the city once the 
first objective was seized. These tasks were 
performed very well. 
The special armoured teams, moving with 
great swiftness, were not called on to employ 
their Flails or Crocodiles. Nor was extensive 
use made of the AVREs, beyond the instance 
referred to above. The move the armoured 
teams Lieutenant-Colonel Rowley described 
as satisfactory but uneventful. 
No suitable opportunity to use the Wasps 
was found. One was in fact knocked out by 
shellfire. They are nonetheless regarded as 
an excellent weapon and have been found 
ineffectual by the CO. Company commanders 
invariably asked for them. Owing to their 
cumbersome weight and vulnerability they 
travel in the rear of the column to be brought 
forward if necessary. 
A Lifebuoy flame-thrower was used by "D" 
Company against a pillbox near ST. MARTIN-
BOULOGNE; one squirt promptly brought 
forth 25 PW. On the whole, however, their 
performance in this operation was not 
satisfactory, only about 45% of them being in 
working order when needed. This, the CO 
felt, was to be explained first, by their fragility, 
and secondly, by the fact that it had not been 
possible to train those who were to fire them. 
Even granting their delicate nature, in the 
Photo by D.I. Grant, NAC PA 137309 
hands of an experienced operator they are a 
reliable and effective weapon. 
Lieutenant-Colonel Rowley remarked of 
the bombing that it had been slightly off its 
mark near MONT LAMBERT but had so 
splattered the objectives of the leading 
companies, instead of hitting LA COCHERIE 
Wood, that it actually eased their advance. 
The fire plan as originally conceived had 
been excellent and in the closing stages 
continued to be so. Every possible enemy 
position had been taped and the response of 
the gunners had never been quicker. 
As for the enemy, despite his numerical 
strength and the almost impregnable 
character of his fortifications. it was obvious 
that his morale left much to be desired. Given 
greater determination on his part, the 
debussing process from the Kangaroos, for 
example, could have been turned into a 
slaughter. The whole operation, moreover, 
would have been a much more costly 
undertaking. Concerning weapons, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Rowley said only one 
mortar had been encountered and that had 
been quickly eliminated by the carrier platoon. 
Finally, the CO said that his men had a 
thorough dislike for Germans. Therefore the 
operation went welL 
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